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A Critique of the Abortion
Funding Decisions: On Private
Rights in the Public Sector
By LESLIE FRIEDMAN GOLDSTEIN*
In Roe v. Wade,' a 1973 decision, the United States Supreme
Court declared that "a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of
certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under our Constitu-
tion"; that "only personal rights that can be deemed 'fundamental'
... are included in this guarantee of personal privacy"; that "the
right has some extension to activities relating to marriage; procrea-
tion; contraception; family relationships; and child rearing and ed-
ucation"; and that "[t]his right of privacy ... is broad enough to
encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy."2 Noting that even "fundamental" rights can be out-
weighed by "compelling governmental interests," Justice Black-
mun declared that the pregnant woman's health needs by the
fourth month of pregnancy justify health-related restrictions on
abortion s and that the state's interest in protecting "potential
human life" is a sufficiently compelling interest to justify a ban on
aborting a fetus unless the health or survival needs of the pregnant
woman outweigh the state's interest.4
* B.A., M.A., University of Chicago; Ph.D., Cornell University. Currently Associate
Professor of Political Science, University of Delaware, and author of THs CONSTrruTONAL
RIGHTS OF WOMEN (1979).
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. Id. at 152-53 (citations omitted).
3. Unless such restrictions prohibit an accepted medical procedure which is "com-
monly used nationally by physicians after the first trimester and which is safer, with respect
to maternal mortality, than even continuation of the pregnancy until normal childbirth."
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 78 (1976) (the Court refers to saline
amniocentesis).
4. 410 U.S. at 162-64. Justice Blackmun did not say that there is no legitimate public
interest in the potential life represented by a pre-viable fetus; he stated only that the inter-
est does not become compelling until the point of viability. Thus the criticism alleging that
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), clashes directly with Roe in recognizing a pre-viability
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Roe v. Wade voided the abortion statutes of a least forty-six
states5 and created a political furor. Some state legislatures reacted
by cutting off Medicaid funds for any abortions not deemed "med-
ically necessary"; some municipalities forbade nontherapeutic
abortions in municipally-funded hospitals; and in the much dis-
cussed "Hyde Amendment,"6 Congress eliminated all nontherapeu-
tic and most therapeutic abortions from the category of medical
services to be paid for by Medicaid.' The Supreme Court upheld
the first two of these responses in Maher v. Roe$ and Poelker v.
Doe,9 and sustained the Hyde Amendment in June 1980, in Harris
v. McRae.10
In Harris v. McRae the Supreme Court settled several ques-
tions. A five-justice majority" ruled that the reference to funding
"medically necessary" services in Title XIX of the Social Security
Act did not override the Hyde Amendment to the same act;112 that
the Hyde Amendment does not violate the establishment clause of
the First Amendment; 8 and that the Hyde Amendment contra-
venes neither the explicit due process command of the Fifth
Amendment nor the equal protection implication of that same
amendment.14 The Court's statutory argument, which focuses on
interest is misplaced. See also Perry, The Abortion Funding Cases: A Comment on the
Supreme Court's Role in American Government, 66 GEo. L.J. 1191, 1196-97 (1978).
5. New York, Hawaii, Alaska and Washington had already legalized nontherapeutic
abortions.
6. Pub. L. No. 96-123, § 109, 93 Stat. 926 (1979) (restricting the use of appropriated
funds to abortions where the mother's life would be endangered or where she had been
raped). For similar restrictions in previous appropriation bills, see Pub. L. No. 95-480, § 210,
92 Stat. 1586 (1978) (The "Hyde Amendments" have always been attached to appropriation
bills); Pub. L. No. 95-205, § 101, 91 Stat. 1460 (1977); Pub. L. No. 94-439, § 209, 90 Stat.
1434 (1976) (without the rape provision).
7. Pub. L. No. 96-123, § 109, 93 Stat. 926 (1979). See also Pub. L. No. 96-86, § 118, 93
Stat. 662 (1979).
8. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
9. 432 U.S. 519 (1977).
°10. 100 S. Ct. 2671 (1980). See also Williams v. Zbaraz, 100 S. Ct. 2694 (1980). The
latter case applied the reasoning of Harris to a state version of the Hyde Amendment; thus,
it receives no separate discussion here.
11. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court in which Chief Justice Burger
and Justices White, Powell and Rehnquist joined.
12. 100 S. Ct. at 2683-85.
13. Id. at 2689.
14. Id. at 2685-89, 2690-91. The Court also rejected, in a footnote, the contention that
the Hyde Amendment was void for vagueness. Id. at 2685 n.17. None of the dissenters de-
fended this contention, and their apparent agreement as to its insignificance appears
warranted.
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the logic of the legislative process of amending laws, is straightfor-
ward and non-problematic. Similarly, the establishment clause ar-
gument raises no novel issues; it rests on a solid line of "secular
purpose" precedents.15 The Court's due process and equal protec-
tion arguments, however, are troublesome.
The arguments in Harris v. McRae did not break new ground.
After devoting two paragraphs to explaining that a legislative re-
fusal to fund nontherapeutic abortions, upheld in Maher v. Roe,
does not differ for constitutional purposes from a legislative refusal
to fund "medically necessary" abortions, at issue in McRae,," Jus-
tice Stewart quoted or paraphrased Justice Powell's Maher opinion
at every step of his argument.17 As Justice Marshall noted in his
dissent, "the Court treats this case as though it were controlled by
Maher."8 Thus, a careful analysis of the McRae decision requires
an analysis of the Maher decision and its companion, Poelker v.
Doe, which provide the basis for the Court's conclusions in McRae.
Even those who did not believe that Roe v. Wade was morally
problematic' and were not concerned about its impact upon the
balance of power between legislature and judiciary 0 may have rea-
son to be troubled by the policy result imposed upon the American
public by the Roe-Maher-Poelker trilogy and reinforced by Harris
v. McRae. It is now the law that the choice of an abortion is a
fundamental "constitutional" right; fundamental, that is, in the
sense that no matter how intensely and profoundly legislative ma-
jorities deplore it, every woman with the means to finance an abor-
tion must be permitted to obtain one, no matter how trivial or cal-
lous her reason for wanting it. It is also the law that a state may
withhold from women in the poorest sector of the population-the
women whose lives will be the most harshly burdened by addi-
tional children-the resources needed for exercising that right,
whether the resources be the cost of medical services themselves or
15. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 653 (1980).
16. 100 S. Ct. at 2687.
17. Stewart's Harris opinion quotes 47 lines of Powell's Maher opinion.
18. 100 S. Ct. at 2710 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
19. Aside from the most ardent right-to-lifers, a substantial sector of the American
public is morally opposed to the legalization of second and third trimester abortions. Blake,
The Abortion Decisions: Judicial Review and Public Opinion, in ABORTION: NEW DiREc-
TIONS FOR POLICY STuDIRs 51-82 (E. Manier ed. 1977).
20. See, e.g., Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE
L.J. 920 (1973).
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simply the use of facilities within a publicly funded hospital that
has a maternity ward. As Justice Stevens points out in his dissent
in McRae, these women might constitutionally be denied such re-
sources even when an abortion is the only medical service that
would save their lives.2 1
But even those who would welcome these policy results, be-
cause to them abortion is more of an evil than any of the harms it
purports to avoid, have reason to be troubled by the implications
of the arguments presented by Justice Powell to justify these re-
sults. As Justice Jackson said in Korematsu v. United States,22
"[A] judicial construction of the due process clause s that will sus-
tain this order is a far more subtle blow to liberty than the promul-
gation of the order itself."'
Those who applauded the new direction signaled by the Court
in Maher and Poelker and pursued by it in McRae2 5 might ponder
the Court's insistence that the denial of funding for abortions "sig-
nals no retreat from Roe."2 6 According to the Supreme Court, free-
dom of choice between abortion and childbirth is still as funda-
mental a right as it was in 1973; nevertheless, while a citizen has a
right to choose, the government may encourage the selection of one
choice over the other by structuring the pattern of available bene-
fits. If the government refrains from imposing a penalty on one
choice and, at the same time, does not distribute the benefits in a
way that discriminates against the members of a suspect class, it
may satisfy the requirements of equal protection by showing some
rational relationship between its selective denial of benefits and a
"constitutionally permissible" purpose. 7 In Maher, the state was
21. 100 S. Ct. at 2714 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
22. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
23. I would add, and the equal protection clause.
24. 323 U.S. at 245-46 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
25. See, e.g., Horan & Marzen, The Moral Interest of the State in Abortion Funding:
A Comment on Beal, Maher, and Poelker, 22 ST. Louis U.L.J. 566 (1979).
26. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 475. Justice Stewart quoted this "no retreat" language
in Harris, 100 S. Ct. at 2687.
27. The traditional equal protection analysis is as follows: A classification in the area
of general economic and social welfare legislation "will not be set aside if any state of facts
reasonably may be conceived to justify it." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961).
A court need only articulate a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest in order to
uphold such a classification. On the other hand, a court must subject to strict scrutiny any
law that sets up a suspect classification, San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodri-
guez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), or that interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right; and the
state must show a compelling government interest if such a law is to stand. Id. The tradi-
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said to have an interest in "encouraging normal childbirth," or in
"protecting the potential life of the fetus."2 According to the ma-
jority argument, however, the protection of potential life has no
special status; it is one permissible goal among many. Thus, a
state, or Congress, is free to take an equally anti-life, and for that
matter, anti-choice, position. A legislature may, for example, con-
stitutionally declare that henceforth it will pay the full cost of
abortions for all pregnant women who are eligible for Medicaid,
but that Medicaid will no longer pay any cost related to childbirth.
Since the plan would bear a rational relationship to the permissi-
ble goals of encouraging family planning and conserving public
funds, it would be entirely constitutional under the logic of Maher,
Poelker and McRae.
The anti-choice implications of these cases are not merely aca-
demic. Supreme Court decisions establish not only results, but
general rules of law, 9 and the principles established in Maher and
Roe extend to cases involving all fundamental rights, not just the
right of privacy. If the Supreme Court intended what it implied in
these cases, the extent to which government may manipulate our
fundamental constitutional rights has now been dramatically in-
creased. An analysis of those implications is offered in the hope
tional indicia of suspectness are: whether "the class is... saddled with such disabilities, or
subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position
of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian
political process." Id. at 28. Although it could, and has, been argued that women and the
poor fit that description, the Court has refused to grant them the higher level of review. See,
e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (sex classification; note particularly Jus-
tice Powell's concurring opinion); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (poverty classifica-
tion). Classifications based on race have been recognized as suspect. See, e.g., Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). A right is fundamental only if the Constitution implic-
itly or explicitly guarantees it. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S.
1, 33-34 (1973). Although the Court has recognized a constitutionally guaranteed freedom of
personal choice in certain matters of marriage and family life, including the freedom to
decide upon abortion, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), in Maher and Harris it avoided the
use of strict scrutiny by claiming that the exercise of the fundamental right in question had
not been impeded-it had simply not been subsidized. Hence, only a rational basis was
required in order to uphold the laws in question.
28. 432 U.S. at 471-78. See also Harris v. McRae, 100 S. Ct. 2685-89. There the Court,
for reasons that are understandable in the context of medically needed abortions, dropped
the discussion of "normal" childbirth and focused solely on the goal of protecting potential
life. Accord 100 S. Ct. at 2713 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2706-07 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
29. See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REv.
1 (1959).
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that, once they are examined, their frightening qualities will con-
vince the Court to retreat from the limb onto which it has ven-
tured. To facilitate that retreat, I shall indicate the signposts in
other precedents that point toward an alternative doctrinal path
for defining the proper relationship between "negative" constitu-
tional freedoms and governmentally conferred benefits.
I. Justice Powell's Approach 0
Justice Powell's approach in Maher has a certain surface at-
tractiveness.31 He argues first that the right recognized in Roe is
purely a negative right; as one facet of "privacy" it is a right to be
left alone, a right of an individual not be intruded upon by the
government when faced with the intensely personal choice of
whether to give birth or to seek an abortion. It is not a positive
right in the sense that it imposes upon the government either a
duty to coerce medical personnel into performing abortions or a
duty to provide citizens with funds adequate to obtain abortions in
the medical marketplace.
Since privacy of choice is only a negative right, the state's re-
fusal to fund abortions does not impinge on the right at all, and
therefore only the minimal rational basis test need be satisfied to
justify any decision not to fund.3 2 The state adds no burden to the
decision to abort; it simply chooses to allocate its funds to alleviate
other types of financial burdens.33 "Indigency" rather than govern-
30. Justices Stevens, Stewart, Rehnquist and White and Chief Justice Burger con-
curred with Justice Powell. Of this group, only Rehnquist and White dissented in Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. at 171, 221, and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 221, 223 (1973) (the original
abortion decisions). Justice Stevens left the Maher-Poelker majority to dissent in Harris.
His position is discussed below.
31. Indeed, it not only attracted five other Justices, but convinced a number of com-
mentators that Maher and Poelker were legally correct. See Hardy, Privacy and Public
Funding: Maher v. Roe as the Interaction of Roe v. Wade and Dandridge v. Williams, 18
AsIz. L. REv. 903 (1976); Comment, State Funding of Elective Abortion: The Supreme
Court Defers to the Legislature, 46 U. CIN. L. Rev. 1003 (1977); Note, Beat v. Doe, Maher v.
Roe, and Non-Therapeutic Abortions: The State Does Not Have to Pay the Bill, 9 Loy.
Cm. L.J. 288 (1977).
32. See note 27 supra. One could argue that Powell neither needed nor articulated a
rational basis for the decision not to fund abortions, although he did offer a rational basis
for funding childbirth. For a discussion of discretionary legislative choices, see Ely, Legisla-
tive and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALc L.J. 1205 (1970).
33. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 471-74. Cf. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 94-95
(1976), cited by the majority in Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 475 n.9.
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ment is the devil that makes abortion hard to obtain for the
poor-and the Constitution does not forbid indigency. Justice
Stewart reiterated this argument in his McRae opinion. 4
Justice Powell's analysis is superficially attractive because the
people and the courts recognize degrees of government coercion
and degrees of governmental intrusiveness into private lives. For
example, there are important and constitutionally recognizable dif-
ferences, based upon the degree of intrusion, between such con-
ceivable modes of governmental regulation of procreation as: (1)
forced breeding, such as that to which American slave women were
subjected; 5 (2) use of governmental power to imprison and fine-
perpetrators of the distribution and use of contraceptives;"6 (3) ex-
ercise of governmental power to imprison and fine those who per-
form abortions;87 (4) denial to the needy of government funds or
the use of governmental facilities for abortions, and the provision
of both for childbirth;38 and (5) the provision of government funds
for both childbirth and abortion for the needy, combined with a
variety of financial rewards for childbirth, including cash payments
for the poor, substantial tax credits for the wealthy, and elaborate
free day-care nurseries for all. Each of these programs, arranged
here in a scale of decreasing intrusiveness, would encourage child-
birth. But Justice Powell and Justice Stewart would find only the
latter two constitutionally permissible,3 9 and Justice Brennan
would probably find only the last permissible.40 It is this recogni-
tion of differing degrees of coerciveness that underscores the neces-
34. 100 S. Ct. at 2685-89.
35. F. DOUGLASS, Lira AND TIMES OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 123-24 (1962 reprint of 1892
ed.) (this coercion was not at government hands).
36. See, e.g. Carey v. Population Servs. Intl, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
37. See, e.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Interestingly, when abortion was a crime the women obtaining abortions were virtually
never prosecuted.
38. Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
39. Although Justice Stewart dissented in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965), which declared a constitutional right to use contraceptives, he announced in 1973
that he accepted Griswold as the law of the land, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 168 (Stewart,
J., concurring). For Justice Powell's views on contraceptives and the Constitution, see Carey
v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring).
40. This is conjecture, however, since in neither his Maher nor his Harris dissent did
Justice Brennan fully articulate the grounds on which he would distinguish forbidden gov-
ernmental discouragement of a protected activity and permitted encouragement of an alter-
native activity. For an attempt to fill out Brennan's argument see § 11 infra.
ABORTION FUNDING DECISIONSWinter 1981]
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
sity of line-drawing, and makes Justice Powell's approach seem
attractive.
In addition, the Powell argument is appealing because his dis-
tinction between negative and positive rights is familiar and ap-
peals to the common sense of the American reader. One may have
a right to travel free from governmental interference, but that does
not imply that one has a right to a bus ride at government ex-
pense.41 Similarly, a right to attend privateschool does not entail a
right to have the state pay one's tuition there.42 Nor does freedom
of the press imply a right to government-supplied printing presses.
And the right of privacy which permits one to read pornography in
one's home free of governmental sanctions 3 is very different from
a right to receive a free supply of pornographic literature from the
government."
Appealing though the arguments are, they are deeply flawed.
Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, in two frequently
quoted opinions that he handed down while on the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court, announced a doctrine that sounds similar
to the one propounded in Maher, Poelker and McRae. Judge
Holmes said of a policeman fired for constitutionally protected po-
litical activity: "The petitioner may have a constitutional right to
talk politics but he has no constitutional right to be a police-
man. . . .The servant cannot complain as he takes the employ-
ment on the terms which are offered to him.' '+4 Three years later
Justice Holmes wrote, in a case involving a preacher arrested for
speaking without a permit on the Boston Common, that:
For the legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid public
speaking in a highway or public park is no more of an infringe-
ment of the rights of a member of the public than for the owner
of a private house to forbid it in his house .... [T]he legislature
may end the right of the public to enter upon the public place by
putting an end to the dedication to public uses. So it may take
41. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 474 n.8.
42. Id. at 475-77. Stewart used the identical example in Harris v. McRae, 100 S. Ct. at
2688-89.
43. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
44. The latter two examples were not used by Powell, perhaps because he saw
problems with them (see § I(B) infra). They come from the lower court dissent in Doe v.
Wohlgemuth, 376 F. Supp. 173, 194 (W.D. Pa. 1974) (Weis, J., dissenting).
45. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 216-17, 29 N.E. 517, 517-18
(1892).
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the less[er] step of limiting the public use to certain purposes."
Holmes' logic and the logic of Powell and Stewart seem of a
piece. Just as Holmes argued that the servant "takes the employ-
ment on the terms which are offered," Powell and Stewart argue
that the citizen takes Medicaid on the terms which are offered.
Just as Holmes argued that the legislature may close public parks,
and thus may take the lesser step of limiting their uses, Powell
argues that the city may close down its municipal hospital, so it
may take the lesser step of limiting its use to non-abortion pur-
poses.47 The problem is that neither of these Holmes precedents is
still good law. American jurisprudence has long since discredited
the theory that since government may totally deny a benefit, it
may also partially deny it, no matter how manipulative or unprin-
cipled the distinctions made.4
Justice Powell attempts to distinguish his own Maher argu-
ment from this discredited approach by discussing three lines of
precedents that might be thought to establish a rule that the state
must fund abortions. He then attempts in Maher to distinguish
abortion funding from each line. He also discusses a line of prece-
dent that, in his opinion, legitimizes the particular pattern of
spending that he upholds.
46. Commonwealth v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510, 511, 39 N.E. 113, 113 (1895), aff'd, Davis
v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897). The statute under which the speech was prohibited
gave the Mayor unfettered discretion to grant or deny speech permits.
47. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
48. The McAuliffe approach was rejected in Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972);
Pickering v. Board of Regents, 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Keyishian v. Board of Educ., 385 U.S.
589 (1967). See also Spevack v. Klein, 585 U.S. 511 (1967); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S.
493 (1967). Of perhaps most immediate relevance is Justice Stewart's comment in Cleveland
Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974), that the state may not, without a compelling
need, deny public employment to "penalize the pregnant teacher for deciding to bear a
child." Id. at 640. Significantly, Justice Powell expressed unhappiness with that approach,
because he believed the government may choose to penalize childbirth or, presumably, ef-
forts to avoid childbirth. He insisted that mandatory maternity leaves in the sixth month of
pregnancy were simply irrational. Id. at 651. In Harris v. McRae, 100 S. Ct. at 2671, Justice
Stewart either changed his opinion or did not see the conflict between his two positions.
The approach of Commonwealth v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510, 39 N.E. 113 (1895), affl'd,
Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897), was rejected in a long line of cases beginning
with Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939). See Canby, Government Funding, Abortions, and
the Public Forum, 1979 ARiz. ST. L.J. 11; Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v.
Louisiana, 1965 Sup. CT. Rav. 1; Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First
Amendment, 43 U. CHi. L. REv. 20 (1975); Stone, Fora Americana, Speech in Public Places,
1974 Sup. CT. R-v. 233; Note, The Public Forum: Minimum Access, Equal Access, and the
First Amendment, 28 STAN. L. Rav. 117 (1975).
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Justice Powell's discussion of the first line of precedents is
useful for the hints that it provides concerning the limits of the
rules the Court created in Maher and Poelker, but it leaves some
important questions unanswered. His discussion of the next two
groups of precedents is riddled with problems; it is this section of
the Maher opinion that has been criticized by a number of com-
mentators, 49 and by Justice Brennan in his dissents in Maher" and
McRae.5 1 Powell's discussion of the group of precedents that he
believes supports his position received no attention at all from the
dissenters,52 and little from the critics.53 Each strand of Powell's
argument in Maher is examined below.
A. No Monopolization by the State
Powell first examined in Maher the claim that indigent wo-
men, because of their poverty, have a constitutional right to gov-
ernment-funded abortions, just as they have a right to govern-
ment-provided attorneys in criminal trials.5 Powell distinguished
abortion services cases from cases that had upheld an indigent's
right to government aid to protect a fundamental right" on the
49. Perry, supra note 4; Susman, Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton Revised in 1976 and
1977-Reviewed?; Revived?; Revested?; Reversed? or Revoked? 22 ST. Louis U.L.J. 581
(1978); Note, State Funding of Nontherapeutic Abortions-Medicaid Plans-Equal Pro-
tection-Right to Choose an Abortion, 11 AKRON L. REV. 345 (1977); Note, A Right Without
Access? Payment for Elective Abortions After Maher v. Roe, 7 CAP. U.L. REv. 483 (1978);
Note, Medicaid Funding for Abortions: the Medicaid Statute and the Equal Protection
Clause, 6 Ho sTRA L. REV. 421 (1978); Note, Abortion, Medicaid, and the Constitution, 54
N.Y.U. L. REv. 120 (1979) [hereinafter referred to as Abortion, Medicaid, and the Constitu-
tion]; Note, Constitutional Law-Abortion-No Requirement to Provide Medicaid Funds
for Nontherapeutic Abortions Under Title XIX of the Social Security Act of 1965 or the
Fourteenth Amendment, 52 Tum. L. REv. 179 (1977); Note, Indigent Women and Abortion:
Limitation of the Right of Privacy in Maher v. Roe, 13 TULSA L.J. 287 (1977).
50. 432 U.S. at 482 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
51. 100 S. Ct. at 2702 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
52. Justice Powell chided them for this, Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 477 n.10. Justice
Marshall made a passing reference to these cases in his dissent in Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438,
461 n.6 (1977), which applies also to the Maher and Poelker decisions, but he certainly did
not fully confront Powell's argument.
53. Contra, L. TRmE, THE CONSTrrUTIONAL PROTECTION OF INnIvIDUAL RiGHTS: LimTS
ON GOVERNMENT AuTHORITY 933 n.77, 931 n.68; Abortion, Medicaid, and the Constitution,
supra note 49; Perry, supra note 4.
54. See 432 U.S. at 469 n.5, 471 n.6, 480 n.13; cf. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438,454 (1977)
(Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 462 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). No one argued in these cases
that all citizens have a constitutional right to government-funded abortions.
55. These rights included the right to a free divorce, Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S.
371 (1971); a free attorney for the first appeal of a criminal conviction, Douglas v. California,
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ground that "Connecticut has made no attempt to monopolize the
means for terminating pregnancies through abortion."56 This com-
ment implies significant limits on the Maher and Poelker holdings.
If, for example, a state acting under the authority of Poelker,
undertook not only to prohibit abortions in publicly-funded hospi-
tals, but also to buy up all of the hospitals in the state in order to
prohibit abortions altogether, thus indirectly restoring the ante-
Roe v. Wade status quo, then the Court might respond as it did in
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth.57 In that case the Court struck
down a regulation banning saline amniocentesis on the ground that
it was a regulation "designed to inhibit, and [had] the effect of
inhibiting [a] vast majority of abortions. 5 8 Or, if Connecticut, en-
couraged by Maher and Poelker, tried to hire all the obstetricians
and gynecologists in the state in order to forbid them to perform
abortions, Powell's qualification would again forbid such a policy.
Powell upheld funding limits in Maher and Poelker, because, as he
saw it, the states, though refraining from aiding abortion, were not
placing obstacles in the path of women seeking abortions. The
state left open avenues to abortions which were financed by other
than public funding.59 Thus, the Powell majority has not rejected
the principle established in Planned Parenthood, that the state is
forbidden to block, or to attempt to block, the exercise of a funda-
mental right.60 Justice Stewart, a member of the Maher majority,
reiterated the "places no obstacle" argument in his McRae opin-
ion, apparently endorsing Maher's implications regarding the con-
nection between state monopolization and government-created
obstacles.61
A question that Powell did not confront in Poelker remains
unanswered: How does one define the "community" in which a ser-
372 U.S. 353 (1963); a free attorney for criminal charges, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963) (not listed by Powell); and the right to a free trial transcript for appealing a
criminal conviction where the state allows such appeals and requires a transcript, Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). Powell did not list, though he might have, the right to a free
ballot, Harper v. Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966). For a discussion of free access
to be on the ballot, see notes 96-116 and accompanying text infra.
56. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 469 n.5.
57. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
58. Id. at 79.
59. See United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973); Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656
(1973) (per curiam) cited by Powell in Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 469 n.5.
60. See also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 193-95 (1973).
61. 100 S. Ct. at 2684-86.
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vice must be monopolized in order to invoke the claim that the
combination of the state's refusal to fund and the state's monopoli-
zation of the service raises constitutional problems? If a publicly-
funded hospital were the only hospital in town, or in the county, or
in a three-county radius, and if the state required that all second
or third trimester abortions be performed only in licensed hospi-
tals, has the state "monopolized" abortions for residents of those
areas?6 2 Or must the monopoly be statewide before it violates the
mandate of Planned Parenthood v. Danforth? These questions
must be answered in future decisions, but they hint at a potential
limitation on the impact of the Poelker rule.
B. No State-Imposed Obstacle Upon the Right
Having distinguished abortion from state-monopolized ser-
vices, Powell next attempted to distinguish the refusal to pay for
abortions from cases that have held that the government may not
"unduly burden" the exercise of a constitutional right. As ex-
plained above, both Powell, in Poelker, and Stewart, in McRae, lo-
cated the obstacle to abortion in the private fact of indigency.
They insisted that the government decision to fund childbirth, or
to provide hospital facilities for childbirth, in no way adds to the
obstacles already facing the indigent pregnant woman desiring an
abortion; the decision not to allow the use of government funds or
facilities for abortions for the poor constitutes not the placing of
an obstacle, but simply the refusal to remove an obstacle.
Justice Powell did not cite any case law in support of this dis-
tinction. In fact, at least as applied to Poelker v. Doe, the arguably
relevant precedents seem to point in a very different direction. 3
Poelker involved a challenge to the constitutionality of an order by
the mayor of St. Louis which prohibited abortions in the two city-
owned hospitals unless needed to prevent death or grave physio-
logical injury." As recently as 1975, when Justice Powell and Jus-
tice Stewart concurred in Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Con-
62. See Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. at 524 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (per curiam).
63. Canby, Government Funding, Abortions, and the Public Forum, 1979 Am. ST.
L.J. 11, argues that the public forum precedents could also control Maher v. Roe, but I find
that analogy more strained than the Poelker analogy. The argument in the text below is
developed strictly with regard to Poelker.
64. In Poelker, the Court stated that "the constitutional question presented here is
identical in principle with that presented by [Maher v. Roe]" and that "the reasons set forth
in ... that case" govern this situation. 432 U.S. at 521 (per curiam).
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rad,6 5 it was held that a municipality's refusal to allow in its public
auditorium a production of "Hair" on the ground that the audito-
rium was dedicated to providing "clean and healthful"66 entertain-
ment amounted to an unconstitutional prior restraint on First
Amendment rights of expression." The Court stressed that the ab-
sence of a government monopoly on auditoriums in town was irrel-
evant, that the auditorium was ordinarily used for expressive activ-
ities, and that to restrict its use to only some constitutionally
protected forms of expression 6 wds to adopt a regulation with the
same prohibitive effect as outright censorship. 9 Not all censorship
is constitutionally forbidden, but the regulations governing the use
of this public facility would have to meet the same strict standards
as would outright censorship.
When a public facility is to be used for First Amendment ex-
pression, Justices Powell and Stewart, and court majorities since
the 1930's,70 have insisted that the government may not pick and
choose which activities it will permit. A "rational basis" for such
choices is not sufficient. Justice Powell himself applied this "public
forum" doctrine in an opinion he authored in 1972. In Healy v.
James71 he rejected the claim of a state college that denying a local
SDS chapter recognition as an official campus organization
amounted to no more than a "refusal to place its stamp of ap-
proval" on it. He argued instead that such a denial, because it
closed off to the group members the usual means of on-campus
communication such as bulletin boards and meeting rooms, placed
an impediment upon, and thereby burdened or abridged, protected
First Amendment rights. The Court noted that while the college
did not monopolize meeting rooms-they could for example, be
rented off-campus-closing the state college's facilities to the SDS
nonetheless abridged the group's associational freedom. 2
65. 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
66. Id. at 549 (quoting from respondent's brief).
67. Id. at 552.
68. There had been no finding that "Hair" was legally obscene which would have ren-
dered it unprotected speech. See Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 54 (1973).
69. 420 U.S. at 552-56.
70. See, e.g., Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147,
163 (1939); Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 155-56 (1946); Edwards v. South Caro-
lina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
71. 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
72. Id. at 181-83 (quoting from the district court's opinion).
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The First Amendment, like the command that government
shall not without a compelling interest intrude into matters so per-
sonal as the decision whether to bear or beget a child,"3 is a nega-
tive command. Yet the First Amendment imposes a positive duty
on government to allow the use of streets and parks for speech,
press, petition and assembly,7 4 and to leave open for uses consis-
tent with these First Amendment guarantees other government-
owned facilities that are ordinarily used for speech and assembly
purposes, unless there is a compelling governmental interest for re-
fusing to do so. 5
Roe v. Wade held that the Constitution implicitly forbids gov-
ernment interference, without a compelling state interest, in a wo-
man's decision to terminate her pregnancy. To refuse the use of
public facilities for performing abortions, where such facilities
would ordinarily be used for exercising that freedom, would seem
to violate directly the rule established in Southeastern Promo-
tions, Ltd. and Healy. The availability of maternity services in a
public hospital suggests that such a facility is ordinarily dedicated
to the exercise of procreative freedom.76 Thus, the majority in
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd., and Justice Powell's own opinion
in Healy seem to contradict the argument Powell puts forth in
Maher.
The Maher-Poelker majority offers no way to distinguish the
logic of the public forum cases from Poelker. Had Powell employed
his Poelker logic in the earlier cases, he could have labeled public
meeting rooms or auditoriums government "subsidies" and thereby
freed their use from stringent constitutional protection also. He of-
fers no explanation for selecting different perspectives in these
cases.
Two of the commentaries on Poelker suggest that Powell and
Stewart may legitimately refute charges of being result-oriented on
this point.7 They suggest that Poelker is distinguished by the pe-
culiarly private quality of the right at stake there, 8 or alterna-
73. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
74. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
75. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975); Healy v. James, 408
U.S. 169 (1972).
76. Which includes the freedom to choose abortion, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
77. Hardy, supra note 31; Horan & Marzen, supra note 25.
78. Hardy, supra note 31, at 920-22; Horan & Marzen, supra note 25, at 571-73.
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tively, that the public forum cases may be distinguished by the
peculiarly private quality of the right at stake.79 One can claim
that it would be odd or even contradictory to rule that the govern-
ment must step in to assist an individual in exercising a right that
is defined as a right to be left alone. 0 One can claim also that the
right to speech, press, assembly and the vote81 are peculiarly pub-
lic rights, and thus government must assist in their exercise.82
These comfortable categories start to blur when one thinks of
actual cases that have come before the Court. The right of political
association, for example, is simultaneously a "public" right and a
private right.83 Moreover, if Poelker is premised on the notion that
the government may refuse to allow the use of facilities that it
owns for activities that it finds too controversial, then a real con-
cern arises about the continuing validity of the right to privacy.
Does Poelker signal a departure from the line of cases protecting
the inviolability of the right to privacy where individuals engage in
private, yet highly controversial conduct?8 Does the Poelker argu-
ment regarding state-funded hospital care imply that persons so
poor as to live in government housing "have" the right of privacy
only in an abstract sense, but that if they want to exercise it they
have to move somewhere else? The Poelker rationale raises these
questions and, unfortunately, leaves them unanswered.
C. No Penalty Or "Direct Burden" Imposed
After announcing that government refusals to aid are not the
same as burdensome governmental acts, Justice Powell then ana-
lyzed two groups of cases that created rules mandating government
aid under certain circumstances. He denied the applicability of
these cases to abortion funding on the ground that one line of
cases stands for the proposition that government may not penalize
79. Hardy, supra note 31, at 919.
80. See Horan & Marzen, supra note 25, at 571-73 (Horan dubs it not just odd but
"outrageous").
81. See discussion of the ballot cases, notes 103-23 and accompanying text infra.
82. See generally Hardy, supra note 24, at 919.
83. One could try making the argument, but it may be difficult to sustain the rationale
that the right of political association is a less private right than that of privacy in the doc-
tor-patient relationship. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama,
357 U.S. 449 (1958).
84. For example, the storage of pornography or the storage of contraceptives. See
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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a constitutionally protected choice, and that the government here
imposes no penalty;8 5 and on the ground that the second line of
cases clearly distinguishes state imposition of a direct burden on
constitutionally protected activity from mere legislative encourage-
ment of an alternative activity.8 6 These two arguments were en-
dorsed in Justice Stewart's McRae opinion.87
Regarding the penalties argument, Justice Powell discussed
Shapiro v. Thompson,88 Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County,89
and Sherbert v. Verner.90 Each of these decisions9 1 invalidated
statutes that denied welfare benefits subsequent to the exercise of
a constitutional right. Shapiro and Memorial Hospital ruled that
if a state provides welfare benefits to its own residents, 92 it cannot
exclude from the category of recipients otherwise eligible residents
simply because they have lived in the area for less than one year.
Brennan, in Shapiro, and Marshall, in Memorial Hospital, rea-
soned that excluding recent migrants serves to penalize the exer-
cise of the constitutional right to travel and therefore would be
constitutional only if "shown to be necessary to promote a compel-
ling government interest."' s Sherbert v. Verner, authored by Jus-
85. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 474 n.8.
86. Id. at 475 n.9, 477 n.10.
87. 100 S. Ct. at 2687-89 (id. at 2688 n.19 exactly parallels Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at
474 n.8).
88. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
89. 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
90. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
91. Supplemented by a substantial body of related precedents, including Lefkowitz v.
Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801 (1977); Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973); Vlandis v. Kline,
412 U.S. 441 (1973); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U.S. 330 (1972); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391
U.S. 563 (1968); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Spevack v. Klein, 385
U.S. 511 (1967); Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956). See L. TRmE,
supra note 53, at 705-10, 1003-05, 1093-96; Van Aistyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege
Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1439 (1968); Note, Unconstitutional
Conditions, 73 HIv. L. REV. 1595 (1960). The precedents for these decisions include a case
involving the denial of public employment on the basis of an exercise of procreative free-
dom, Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974). See also Turner v. Depart-
ment of Employment Security, 423 U.S. 44 (1975).
92. In Shapiro these were Aid for Dependent Children [AFDC] benefits, and the hold-
ing also applied to congressional regulations for the District of Columbia, 394 U.S. at 622-23.
In Memorial Hospital the benefits were county payments for non-emergency medical care,
415 U.S. at 252.
93. 394 U.S. at 634. Accord, 415 U.S. at 254-62. See also Hardy, supra note 31, at 919-
20 (this penalty analysis combines the operation of the equal protection clause with that of
the due process clause).
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tice Brennan, dealt with an unemployment compensation statute
that required a worker to be available for gainful employment
Monday through Saturday in order to qualify for benefits. The eli-
gibility requirement effectively penalized a Seventh Day Adventist
for exercising her religious beliefs, and the Court held that this ef-
fect triggered strict scrutiny. Since the state's refusal to grant a
special Sabbatarian exemption from the statutory requirement
could not meet the compelling interest test, the exemption had to
be granted.94
Powell argued that these cases are not analogous to Maher v.
Roe because they involved withholding benefits from persons "who
were otherwise entitled to the benefits" on the ground that those
persons exercised a fundamental right.95 He asserted that the re-
fusal to fund the exercise of a right is distinguishable from the
threat to withdraw a benefit if the right is exercised. He noted that
the penalty argument might have prevailed if the state had denied
"general welfare benefits to all women who had obtained abortions,
and were otherwise entitled to the benefits."9 6 Justice Stewart
made the identical argument in McRae.97 In other words, under
the Constitution a state may not mandate, for example, a fifty dol-
lar reduction in food stamp benefits during any month in which a
woman obtains a Medicaid abortion,98 but the state may deny the
same woman the two hundred dollar benefit of a Medicaid abor-
tion. The first action, to Powell and others of the Maher majority,
is a penalty, but the second is not. Yet surely a woman so poor
that she qualifies for Medicaid would find that a fifty dollar reduc-
94. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). For a more recent example of a case requiring a religious
exemption from a neutral statute, see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
95. Justice Powell appears somewhat uneasy with the applicability of this analysis to
Sherbert. He says tersely that his reasoning applies "similarly" to Sherbert, and that Sher-
bert was "decided in the significantly different context of a constitutionally imposed 'gov-
ernmental obligation of neutrality' originating in the Establishment and Freedom of Relig-
ion Clauses of the First Amendment." Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 474 n.8. It is hard to see
the point of this disclaimer since the requirement imposed by the Court in Sherbert, that
states give a special exemption only to religious objectors to Saturday labor, appears to clash
directly with the neutrality required by the establishment clause. See 374 U.S. at 418-23
(Harlan, J., dissenting); W. BmNs, THE Fr AMEmmENT AmD THE FuTuRE op AMRuCAN
DEMOCRACY 37-39 (1970).
The Court, in Harris, was apparently less uncomfortable with the Sherbert example,
and elaborated its relevance at greater length. 100 S. Ct. at 2688 n.19.
96. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 474 n.8.
97. 100 S. Ct. at 2688 n.19.
98. Unless the state could demonstrate a compelling interest.
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tion in food stamp benefits is less of a burden upon her right to
freedom in the child-bearing decision than is the denial of a two
hundred dollar Medicaid benefit.
Some clarification as to how Justice Powell reached his conclu-
sions is offered in his statement that "Shapiro and Maricopa
County did not hold that states would penalize the right to travel
interstate by refusing to pay the busfares of indigent travelers." '99
But Powell's analogy between government-funded travel and gov-
ernment-funded abortion fails because the plaintiffs in Maher were
not arguing for a general right to free abortions; they were arguing
only that funding for childbirth and not abortion was an unconsti-
tutional distribution of benefits. In their analysis the state estab-
lishment of Medicaid benefits for general maternity health-care
costs would allow a pregnant woman seeking professional medical
help in treating her pregnancy to be eligible for benefits but for her
decision to exercise her constitutionally protected choice of abor-
tion as the most appropriate treatment.
The Maher dissenters, Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun, de-
fined the benefits in question as medical services needed to cope
with the physical condition of pregnancy.00 Hence, they agreed
with the plaintiffs that persons who would otherwise be eligible are
denied a government benefit solely because they choose to exercise
a constitutionally protected right. On the other hand, Justice Ste-
vens, joining in the majority opinion in Maher, believed the Court
to have defined the benefit as medical services that are necessary
in the sense that one's health is endangered by doing without
them.101 Thus, pregnant women, because they can safeguard their
health with competent medical care during childbirth, cannot be
said to have been denied the government benefit at all. Women
seeking non-necessary abortions, which would by this definition
fall outside the ambit of the government benefit, thus could not be
viewed as being penalized for exercising this right. Under this anal-
ysis, a woman choosing an elective abortion is in no sense other-
wise eligible for the benefit denied her.
However, the plaintiffs in McRae sought medically necessary
99. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 474 n.8.
100. See Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 449-50 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
101. See Harris v. McRae, 100 S. Ct. at 2712 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (a discussion of
the Maher decision).
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abortions. 10 2 They sought what amounted to medical treatment for
a present medical need. Had the treatment sought been anything
other than an abortion, the Medicaid patient would have been re-
imbursed for it-in other words, the patient was "otherwise eligi-
ble" to receive the benefits. The Court held, however, that the
state was not obligated to fund medically necessary abortions.
Thus, Justice Stevens, who had joined in the majority opinion and
endorsed Powell's argument in Maher, arrived at a conclusion op-
posite Powell's in McRae. The reason for this result is that Maher
failed to articulate its defining principle. Justice Stevens' focus on
the medical necessity for the abortion as defining the parameters
of who was "otherwise entitled" to Medicaid benefits apparently
was personally meaningful to him; Maher fails to suggest any rule
by which other judges or legislatures could discern in advance of a
Supreme Court decision how to define that category of benefits to
which an excluded group would be "otherwise entitled."
A second group of "penalty" or "burden" cases from which
Powell attempted to distinguish Maher concerns state restrictions
on access to the ballot. To support his contention that government
funding which encourages one alternative to a constitutionally pro-
tected activity differs from a government policy which directly bur-
dens that same protected conduct, Powell pointed to the difference
between the campaign-financing decision, Buckley v. Valeo, 0 3 and
a group of ballot access decisions that preceded Buckley.'"
These [cases] were, of course, direct burdens not only on the can-
didate's ability to run for office but also on the voter's ability to
voice preferences .... In contrast, the denial of public financing
to some Presidential candidates is not restrictive of voters' rights
and less restrictive of candidates'. . . . [T]he inability, if any, of
minority party candidates ... will derive ... from their inabil-
ity to raise private contributions.105
The cases that deal with state restrictions on access to the bal-
lot, such as American Party of Texas v. White,106 do not fit quite
so neatly into a "direct burden" slot as Powell implies. One could
argue, for example, that the state aids the candidates whose names
102. 100 S. Ct. at 2679-80.
103. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
104. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 475 n.9.
105. Id. (the Maher Court quotes Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 94-95 adding the em-
phasis and omitting the footnote).
106. 415 U.S. 767 (1974).
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it prints on the ballots it provides to voters. So long as the states
do not prohibit write-in votes, thereby monopolizing the process,
the state could be said to be imposing no burden on the candidates
left off the ballot. It could be argued that the state merely aids
their opponents. But the Supreme Court has declared that this
analysis is without merit.107 In Lubin v. Panish1°8 the Court ex-
plained how this sort of "aid" to some candidates amounts to a
"burden" on other candidates:
The realities of the electoral process . . .strongly suggest that
"access" via write-in votes falls far short of access in terms of
having the name of the candidate on the ballot. [A filing fee sys-
tem] would allow an affluent candidate to put his name before the
voters on the ballot ... while the indigent ... would be forced
to rest his chances solely upon those voters who would remember
his name and take the affirmative step of writing it on the
ballot.109
The problem the Court identified in Lubin was not exactly a
direct burden on someone's freedom to seek office; after all, if the
indigent were able to raise private contributions the state's filing
fee would not be a burden, but rather the price paid for having his
name printed on the ballot. The Court indicated that some forms
of state aid to some alternatives in effect burden other alternatives,
and those burdens must meet strict constitutional standards.110
The Court drew the distinction in Buckley quoted by Powell,
but it also presented a number of arguments that undermine the
force of the quoted distinction. The Court noted that access to the
ballot is more "necessary" for winning an election than is public
financing,"" and that the public financing system included a new
expenditure ceiling that might allow minor parties to spend more
money relative to what the major parties spent.11" Finally, after
noting "that public financing is generally less restrictive of access
107. 415 U.S. at 772 n.3, 794-75. See also Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 719 (1974).
But see id. (Blackmun & Rehnquist, J.J., concurring in part).
108. 415 U.S. 709 (1974). In Lubin the Court did not reach the constitutional question
of whether the avenue of write-in votes was adequate to overcome the restrictions imposed
by filing fees, but in American Party of Texas the Court held that a system of write-ins was
not adequate compensation for absentee ballots that omitted from the ballot all names ex-
cept those of the two major party candidates, 415 U.S. at 795.
109. 415 U.S. at 719 n.5.
110. See id. at 718.
111. 424 U.S. at 101-02.
112. Id. at 94, 99.
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to the electoral process than the ballot-access regulations,"'13 the
Court concluded: "In any event, Congress enacted [the Campaign
Finance Act] in furtherance of sufficiently important governmental
interests and has not unfairly or unnecessarily burdened the politi-
cal opportunity of any political party."11 4 This statement may not
indicate the strictest scrutiny the Court has ever imposed, but it
goes far beyond the minimal scrutiny that Justice Powell imposed
on a government decision to fund childbirth but not abortion." 5
Perhaps most important, though, in distinguishing Buckley
from Maher is the qualifier with which the Buckley Court began
its discussion of discrimination: "[Ilt is important at the outset to
note that the Act applies the same limitations on contributions to
all candidates regardless of their present occupations, ideological
views, or party affiliations.""' In upholding the public financing
section of the law the Court stressed Congress' ideologically neu-
tral goals such as protecting public funds against frivolous claims
of candidacy. Surely if Congress had attempted to fund only those
parties with "good" or relatively noncontroversial" 1 platforms it
would have been faced with severe constitutional problems. It is
inconceivable that Justice Powell would vote to uphold a public
campaign finance law that explicitly limited government aid to
those parties that endorse the Bill of Rights, thereby eliminating
from eligibility, for example, Nazis and totalitarian Communists.
Justice Powell's opinion in Maher, however, offers no clear princi-
ple by which to distinguish a government decision that would fund
Democrats and Republicans but not Nazis and Communists, from
a government decision to fund childbirth but not abortion.
Justice Stewart's McRae opinion did not discuss this group of
cases, although it relied heavily upon Justice Powell's distinction
between placing a direct burden on an activity and encouraging an
alternative to that activity." 8 Justice Stewart merely adopted Jus-
tice Powell's phrasing, suggesting no solution for the problem dis-
113. Id. at 95. Note that this wording concedes that public financing is somewhat re-
strictive of the electoral process.
114. Id. at 95-96.
115. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 475-77.
116. 424 U.S. at 31.
117. Cf. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 479 ("The decision whether to expend state funds
for nontherapeutic abortion is fraught with judgments of policy and value over which opin-
ions are sharply divided.").
118. 100 S. Ct. at 2688.
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cussed above.
Both the Brennan dissent, in which Justices Marshall and
Blackmun joined,119 and the Stevens dissent in McRae, 2 ' identi-
fied as a weakness in Justice Stewart's position precisely the diffi-
culty noted above in Powell's Maher argument.12 In McRae, Jus-
tice Stevens warned that the majority's reasoning would permit the
denial of medical benefits to persons on the grounds that they are
Republicans or Catholics or Orientals. 2 Justice Brennan raised
the spectre of government-funded rides to the voting booth exclu-
sively for members of one or another political party.1s 3
D. Direct Precedents for Maher v. Roe
In Maher, Justice Powell drew attention to a group of cases
that appear to have permitted a relationship between a constitu-
tional right and government funding very similar to the one at is-
sue here. 2" Those cases deal with the constitutional right to be
free from government interference in the choice of schooling,125
and government funding of public schools.126 Meyer v. Nebraska127
upheld the right of teachers to instruct children in foreign lan-
guages and the right of parents to hire them for that purpose; at
the same time, it endorsed the right of the state to prescribe
whatever curriculum it prefers in state-funded schools. 28 Pierce v.
Society of Sisters 29 upheld the right of parents to send their chil-
dren to private schools, again without implying that the state's
power to fund public education was thereby limited. More re-
cently, the Court in Norwood v. Harrison'0 rejected the argument
119. Id. at 2705 n.6.
120. Id. at 2713 n.4, 2714-15.
121. The lack of a separate opinion by Stevens in Maher seems to indicate that he had
not yet noticed the weakness in Powell's argument.
122. Id. at 2714-15.
123. Id. at 2705. For a discussion of the limits of Brennan's critique, see § II infra.
124. See 432 U.S. at 475-77. He relegates the other precedents discussed herein to
footnotes. This is the only set of cases, other than the abortion rights cases themselves, that
Powell discusses in the text of his opinion.
125. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923).
126. See, e.g., Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
127. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
128. Id. at 402.
129. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
130. 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
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that there is a "right of private or parochial schools to share with
public schools in state largesse."1Is In Maher, Justice Powell
chided the dissenters for ignoring these cases, in particular Nor-
wood v. Harrison, which he calls a "much more analogous author-
ity" than any of the precedents discussed in the dissents. 13 2 In Mc-
Rae, the dissenters still had not formulated any rebuttal to the
private school example. All four dissenters in McRae were silent
regarding the Pierce and Norwood precedents.
The thrust of Justice Powell's argument, then, is that there
exist some fundamental rights which are solely negative rights, and
that the government may not prohibit them or place obstacles
upon their free exercise. It may, however, refuse to assist persons
who exercise these rights and may choose to actively encourage al-
ternatives to them. The school cases exemplify one such negative
right. The right to seek or to provide an abortion is another.
Norwood is not, however, entirely analogous to Maher. Nor-
wood declared unconstitutional a program in which the state pro-
vided free books to a segregated private school. Although one has a
right to attend private school, one has no constitutional right to
attend, free of government interference, a segregated private
school.133 The state is constitutionally forbidden to aid segregated
schools."3' By contrast, a woman has a constitutional right to
choose to terminate her pregnancy, and the government is not for-
bidden to assist her in that choice.135 Justice Stewart's opinion in
McRae abandoned the unwieldy Norwood approach and relied on
the much less problematic Pierce rationale for making his point
about private schools.136 Just as parents have a right to send their
children to private schools, so, too, do women have the right to
decide to terminate their pregnancies. But just as the state has no
131. Id. at 462, quoted by Powell, J., in Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 477.
132. 432 U.S. at 477 n.10.
133. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976). See also Goldstein, Death and
Transfiguration of the State Action Doctrine-Moose Lodge v. Irvis to Runyon v. McCrary,
4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1 (1977).
134. This is what Norwood established. 413 U.S. at 462-68.
135. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 473-74. Thus, Justice Brennan, who focuses his analy-
sis on whether government discourages the exercise of a constitutional right, would find
Norwood a wholly inapposite precedent; the state may discourage attendance at segregated
schools, but the citizen has no right to attend such schools.
136. 100 S. Ct. at 2689. Justice Stewart buttressed his private school argument with an
additional example; he states that there is a right to use contraceptives but not to receive
them at government expense.
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obligation to fund or refrain from funding private schools, neither
is it obligated to fund an indigent woman's abortion.
How far either Justice Powell or Justice Stewart wishes to ex-
tend his reasoning is unclear. Would either argue, for example,
that the state may choose to fund some secular private schools but
not others, funding only those that offer an anti-abortion curricu-
lum?13 7 Or would either argue that during a wave of anti-immi-
grant hysteria, a public school may bar the use of its classrooms for
the study of foreign languages even by civic groups using them in
the evenings? " s Neither Justice Powell nor Justice Stewart offers
any clear principle by which to distinguish the legitimate from the
illegitimate application of the Pierce and Norwood precedents.
Justices Stevens"39 and Marshall," 0 each in a lone dissent in
McRae, confronted the Court's lack of guiding principle by em-
bracing the problem as its own solution; that is, each argued that
the Court ought to balance competing interests and decide which
are the constitutionally subordinate, rather than to apply empty
formalistic rules that do not produce "equal justice."14 1 Neither
Justice Marshall nor Justice Stevens explained how the Court is to
decide which constitutional interests are superior to others. The
case-by-case balancing approach is not likely to offer any advan-
tage over Powell and Stewart's affirmative/negative freedoms ap-
proach. In other words, Powell and Stewart, as well as Marshall
and Stevens, believe that some selective government funding af-
fecting constitutional rights is constitutionally acceptable and
some is not; none of the four offers a means by which to determine
which rights will receive preferential treatment.
II. Justice Brennan's Approach
Justice Brennan" 2 tried in Maher to supply what Powell ne-
137. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); Grosjean v. American Press, 297
U.S. 233 (1936).
138. See § II(B) supra.
139. 100 S. Ct. at 2712-16 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 2706 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall also concurred in the Bren-
nan dissent. He dissented as well in the Beal, Maher and Poelker cases. See 432 U.S. at 438,
519, 526.
141. 100 S. Ct. at 2712 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
142. Some commentary follows Justice Brennan's basic approach. See notes 49 & 53
supra.
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glected-a principle that would distinguish forbidden manipula-
tions of public facilities and funds from permitted ones. Brennan
suggested in Maher that government may not adopt a scheme that
"grants and withholds financial benefits in a manner that discou' -
ages significantly the exercise of a fundamental constitutional
right. '143 His McRae dissent continued to advocate the adoption of
this rule.
1 4 4
The language in these dissents, like Brennan's language in
Sherbert v. Verner, 1 45 blurred the difference between a forbidden
effect and a forbidden motivation.1 46 Some of the commentary on
Maher that supports Brennan's basic conclusion refines it by fo-
cusing more narrowly on the matter of unconstitutional
motivation.1 "
This refinement is useful because any genuine state effort to
make childbirth less burdensome for the indigent-for example, by
providing free day-care facilities-might in effect discourage abor-
tions. Brennan does not seem to intend to forbid such measures,
but his rule, focusing as it does only on effect, might have this
result.1 48
Justice Powell avoided acknowledging that Maher's funding
scheme is motivated by a desire to discourage abortions. He
claimed that the state is simply making "a value judgment favoring
childbirth over abortion, and implement[ing] that judgment by the
allocation of public funds."' 149 Childbirth is a very expensive proce-
143. 432 U.S. at 488-89 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
144. 100 S. Ct. at 2702 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
145. 374 U.S. at 403-06. Note in particular the phrase in the middle of page 405,
"whatever their purpose." In Harris Justice Brennan continued this blurring. He referred to
schemes that "incidentally or intentionally" burden protected choices. 100 S. Ct. at 2704
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
146. See A. BICEL, Tim LEAST DANGERous BRNc: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR
OF POLITIcs 208-21 (1962); L. TRBE, supra note 53, at 591-98; Brest, Palmer v. Thompson:
An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 SuP. CT. REv.
95; Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J.
1205 (1970).
147. See Perry, supra note 4; Abortion, Medicaid, and the Constitution, supra note
49. Tribe seems to argue for a forbidden effect doctrine and for a more narrow forbidden
motivation doctrine. See L. TRIE, supra note 53, at 931, 934-35.
148. But see note 127 and accompanying text supra, for a general discussion of Pow-
ell's use of Norwood. In Norwood, measures discouraging a particular choice of school were
not only permitted but required, yet Powell claims that Norwood is "much more analogous"
than the other precedents.
149. 432 U.S. at 474.
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dure, much more expensive than abortion, and if the states wish to
encourage indigent women to choose the more expensive proce-
dure, one "rational" means of doing so is to pay for it. At no point
in Justice Powell's opinion did he mention discouraging abortion.
Rather, he spoke repeatedly of encouraging "an alternative activ-
ity,'" 150 of encouraging "actions deemed to be in the public inter-
est,"151 of "encouraging childbirth."152 Justice Stewart employed
similar phrasing in McRae: "encourages alternative activity," "en-
couraging childbirth."' 153 The clogst Justice Stewart came to ac-
knowledging that abortions are actively discouraged by the state
was his statement that the government is favoring "childbirth over
abortion" and that it is making "childbirth a more attractive alter-
native than abortion."1"
Powell and Stewart apparently assumed that (1) when the
state funds something, its decision requires in general only some
rational relation to a valid governmental goal; (2) there is a ra-
tional basis for funding childbirth; and (3) the state need not pro-
vide a reason for a decision against funding, for it fails to fund an
infinite number of things. Consequently, neither Justice Powell nor
Justice Stewart provided any explanation at all for the state's
choice not to fund abortions. Powell's only reference to the subject
is a description of the controversy surrounding this "sensitive"
topic "fraught with judgments of policy and value over which opin-
ions are sharply divided."1 55 Powell apparently sees the state as
encouraging childbirth, a popular alternative, and as doing nothing
about abortion, since it is so controversial. Similarly, Justice Stew-
art in McRae alluded to the "sensitive" nature of the policy choice
involved and insisted that the question of federal subsidization "is
a question for Congress to answer, not a matter of constitutional
entitlement."1 56 As for a congressional decision not to subsidize,
abortion is intrinsically different from those other medical proce-
dures that Congress chooses to subsidize, and to the Stewart ma-
jority that fact was sufficient to justify the congressional
150. Id. at 475.
151. Id. at 476.
152. Id. at 478 (quoting Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 446 (1977)).
153. 100 S. Ct. at 2687, 2692.
154. Id.
155. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 479.
156. 100 S. Ct. at 2689.
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decision.1 7
Powell and Stewart's treatment of abortion funding, however,
seems distorted. It is one thing to fund maternity services gener-
ally in order to alleviate financial pressures on pregnant indigents,
or even partially to fund childbirth up to the point that the cost
equals the cost of abortion; the latter method could be viewed as
an attempt to enhance the freedom of a poor woman faced with
the choice between abortion and childbirth by allowing her to
choose in the absence of economic pressures. 158 It is quite another
thing, however, to adopt a policy toward one group of persons who
must make a choice between A and B, which says that the state
will fund B but not A. This policy must be viewed as discouraging
A and encouraging B.
A policy that merely makes childbirth more attractive would
not necessarily share this flaw. State funding of childcare, for ex-
ample, operates as an incentive not only upon pregnant women,
but upon all potential parents; it encourages them to consider
parenthood as an option by easing the economic burden of caring
for the child. A policy of providing free medical care for childbirth
and refusing to provide it for abortion, however, influences only
pregnant persons. It rewards one choice and ipso facto penalizes
the other, and all pregnant women must choose, confronted as they
are with the fact of the developing fetus. That legislative decisions
to fund childbirth and not abortions are motivated by a desire to
discourage abortion is clear, then, from the nature of the case. 159
But even if it were not, any literate adult living in the United
States since 1975 who has paid attention to politics knows that the
exclusion of abortion services from Medicaid is motivated by oppo-
sition to abortion.
Does the concession that a particular government policy has
the purpose and effect of discouraging the exercise of a constitu-
tional right mean that the policy itself is unconstitutional? Justice
Brennan and some of the commentators seem to think so, 160 but
there are good arguments to the contrary.
157. Id. at 2691-93.
158. Funding both childbirth and abortion would accomplish the same result, but
there is strong political and perhaps moral opposition to funding abortion.
159. Cf. Simson, Abortion, Poverty, and the Equal Protection of the Laws, 13 GA. L.
REv. 505, 513 n.44 (1979).
160. See note 49 supra.
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Although there is no constitutional right to attend segregated
schools, there is authority that suggests a constitutional right to
maintain racially segregated private associations.161 Still, most citi-
zens probably would permit the government to discourage such
private associations. Similarly, there is a constitutional right to run
for office as a Nazi, but most would want the government to dis-
courage Nazism. Neither Justice Brennan's nor Justice Powell's
analysis offers a coherent doctrine for distinguishing cases where
government may act to discourage certain constitutionally pro-
tected choices from cases where it may not.
III. An Alternative Approach
The distinction between permissible and forbidden burdens
placed by the government upon the exercise of constitutionally
protected rights is difficult to formulate into a rule. The govern-
ment clearly may not adopt a policy of financing all anti-Nazi can-
didates while excluding Nazi candidates, assuming that the Nazis
stood for peaceful change through legal channels, so that they
would enjoy First Amendment protection. Similarly, the govern-
ment may not subsidize all anti-Nazi newspapers while excluding
pro-Nazi newspapers.162 Yet certainly the government may adopt
and finance educational programs in public schools, in state uni-
versities, in government publications, and on public television that
openly and vehemently discourage Nazism, or private racial segre-
gation, or pornography. What distinguishes these policies
constitutionally? 163
The answer is not obvious, but one can offer tentative steps
towards an answer.1 6 A democracy's survival depends on some
161. See note 133 supra.
162. Similar examples to this are used in L. TRIBE, supra note 53, at 933 n.77; Perry,
supra note 4, at 1197.
163. Tribe suggests that the distinction is that government has a kind of First Amend-
ment right of advocacy but that government may not "grant and withhold funds so as to
favor those whose values coincide with its own." Tribe's distinction seems inadequate be-
cause government often disburses funds favorably to those whose values coincide with its
own; for example, it gives tax breaks to people who donate to charities. See L. TRIBE, supra
note 53, at 933-94.
164. Neither Brennan nor Powell in Maher even posed the question. Powell implicitly
denied that any discouragment is taking place, 432 U.S. at 474, and Brennan argued that all
discouragment of protected choices is banned unless the compelling state interest test can
be met. 432 U.S. at 489 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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level of public commitment to a democratic form of government
and to its underlying values,"6 ' and the government fosters that
commitment through political socialization166 or citizen education.
Although our Constitution did create areas in which .private
choices are meant to be uncoerced by government, when govern-
ment is acting in its role as educator, it may still discourage partic-
ular choices within these areas.
Contemporary government, however, acts in ways that are
neither educational nor coercive, but somewhere in between. In the
late twentieth century, for example, American government has be-
come an overwhelmingly powerful force in the private sector as a
purchaser and provider of goods and services. The question posed
by Maher, Harris and Poelker, is whether government may use its
influence as purchaser and provider of goods and services to influ-
ence citizens' choices within areas constitutionally protected from
government coercion. The state may not pay people to join a cer-
tain political party, or to vote for certain candidates, because those
choices, although they have public impact, are meant to be private,
free choices. If a local police force paid $100 bribes to obtain third
party "consent" to search for evidence, the Court would have to
see that such consent was not "free or voluntary" in the sense con-
templated by our Constitution. Funding can pressure choices in
ways that are less coercive than the threat of imprisonment, but a
pressured choice is still not a free choice.
If government may not use its power as a provider of goods
and services to influence constitutionally protected choices, what
becomes, then, of the free day-care policy that was aimed at mak-
ing childbirth an attractive alternative? If the decision whether to
bear children was meant to be a free choice,6 7 does this policy cre-
ate forbidden pressure? The answer would be no, because the pur-
pose of the policy was something other than encouraging people to
have children. If government adopted a policy of pressuring people
into having children, a compelling governmental interest would be
165. I would hesitate to specify the level. There is an enormous political science litera-
ture debating this subject. For one of the classic studies see McCloskey, Consensus and
Ideology in American Politics, 58 Am. POL. SCL REv. 361-79 (1964).
166. On the relation between discouraging pornography and political socialization, see
H. CLOR, OBscENITY AND PUBLIC MoRALrTY: CENSORSHIP IN A LmERAL SOCIETY (1969); Berns,
Pornography vs. Democracy, 22 PUB. INTEREST 3 (1971); Bickel, Kauffmann, McWilliams &
Cohen, Concurring and Dissenting Opinions, 22 PUB. INTEREST 25 (1971).
167. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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required to justify that policy under the Constitution.
Conclusion
Roe v. Wade held that the choice to have an abortion fell
within the constitutionally protected area of free, private choice.
That holding may have been in error, but the Supreme Court can-
not simply act as though it did not exist. In Maher, Poelker and
McRae, the Supreme Court has made new law affecting the status
of constitutionally protected choices that implies a variety of
threats to basic constitutional freedoms. Perhaps the Court will ig-
nore what it has done, and let Maher and Poelker and McRae, rest
as awkward anomalies in constitutional doctrine. But constitu-
tional precedents usually extend beyond their immediate results,
and for that reason a clarification is urgently needed.
This article has suggested two possible rules of clarification:
(1) Government may not deny the use of a public facility for the
exercise of a constitutional right when that facility is ordinarily
dedicated to the exercise of that freedom and (2) Government,
when not acting in its role as educator, may not use its power as a
provider of goods and services to influence constitutionally pro-
tected choices.
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